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ILLINOIS CONSERVATOR'S RIGHT
TO INVADE JOINT SAVINGS ACCOUNT
INTRODUCTION

The joint tenancy or joint and survivorship bank account has enjoyed
widespread use for many years. One may surmise from this continued use that
the law surrounding these accounts is uniform and clearly settled. Quite to the
contrary, the treatment of these accounts in the courts has been varied, and is
confusing.
The basis of the confusion is the privilege of each co-depositor to withdraw
funds from the account on his own signature, without the approval of the joint
tenant. This privilege, by which each co-depositor may consume funds held in
it, distinguishes the joint bank account from a true joint tenancy in which
"under property law the right of the co-tenants is confined to a common use."'
A particularly baffling problem arises when one of the joint depositors is
adjudicated incompetent and the conservator of his estate attempts to withdraw
funds in the account from the bank or have the balance transferred to an account
in the name of the estate. Illinois banks and savings and loan associations currently meet this problem in a variety of ways. Some institutions, on the assumption that the conservator acquires the same rights in the account as his ward had
while the latter was competent, require only a presentation of the letters
of office before allowing the funds to be removed, while others require either
an order from the probate court or a joining of the co-depositor in the transaction.
Two Illinois decisions, In re Estate of Cook2 and Manta v. Kahl,3 have
dealt with the problem. In each case, the conservator had withdrawn the balance
of the joint account. The other co-depositor sued the conservator in the first
case and the bank in the second. Both suits were unsuccessful. The court in
Manta said that the conservator succeeded to the same rights as the incompetent
had previously held under the depositor agreement. These decisions provide
support for the policy of those institutions which pay the joint account to a
conservator upon the mere presentation of his letters of office. One writer 4
believes that allowing a conservator to step into the shoes of his ward and
giving him power to withdraw from the joint account is consistent with the
Illinois statute covering joint bank accounts. 5

1 R. Brown, Brown on Personal Property 217 (2d ed. 1955).
2 282 Ill. App. 412 (1934).
3 348 II. App. 375, 108 N.E.2d 781 (1952).
4 Kepner, The Joint and Survivorship Bank Account-A Concept Without a Name,

41 Calif. L. Rev. 596, 633 (1953).
5 Ill. Rev. Stat., ch. 76, § 2(a) (1969) reads as follows:
When a deposit in any bank or trust company transacting business in this
state has been made or shall hereafter be made in the names of two or more persons
payable to them when the account is opened or thereafter, such deposit or any
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Another writer 6 believes that these cases were decided on grounds other
than the issue of the conservator's right to invade. The petitioner in Cook sought
a division of the joint account and payment to her of one half of the balance.
The court decided the case under contract principles. The contract in question
among the parties and the bank provided that each of the co-depositors could
withdraw from the account, but did not provide for any division. The court's
opinion was that to allow a division would be to interject into the contract a
provision which was not within the intention of the parties.
In Manta plaintiff claimed the entire balance of a joint account which the
conservator had withdrawn prior to the death of the incompetent. Plaintiff
based his claim on the allegation that the bank had negligently and wrongfully
paid the account which would have belonged to plaintiff by way of his right
of survivorship after the incompetent's death. Plaintiff's failure to show that he
contributed to the account is probably a significant factor in the decision, but
the court decided against him because of a failure in pleading. Plaintiff did not
allege (1) that he was entitled to demand the fund at the time payment was
made, (2) that any demand had been made, (3) that such demand was in
compliance with the by-laws, rules and regulations of the bank, and (4) that
the bank owed a duty to plaintiff which was breached by its payment to the
conservator. In light of the reasons for the decision, the court's statement that
the conservator succeeded to the incompetent's rights appears to be only dicta.
The opinions in Cook and Manta do not establish a rule in Illinois that an
estate conservator has all the rights of his ward to invade joint bank accounts.
They merely demonstrate that one particular form of relief is unavailable, and
that the absence of certain allegations is fatal to a co-depositor's pleadings.
Little likelihood exists that these cases would be decisive in determining the
outcome in a properly pleaded case seeking a reasonable relief.
PERSONAL RIGHTS, POWERS AND ELECTIONS

The position of conservator of an incompetent's estate is created by, and
the broad powers it encompasses are defined by, statute. 7 The courts have from
time to time found that the best interests of the incompetent could best be served
only by placing certain limitations on the conservator's power.
Generally speaking, a conservator is entrusted with the care and management of his ward's estate. However, his powers are not plenary; he does not
part thereof or any interest or dividend thereon may be paid to any one of said
persons whether the other or others be living or not, and when an agreement
permitting such payment is signed by all said persons at the time the account is
opened or thereafter the receipt or acquittance of the person so paid shall be valid
and sufficient discharge from all parties to the bank for any payments so made.
6 3 W. James, Illinois Probate Law and Practice (1951), 1968 Pocket Part III.
7 Ill. Rev. Stat., Ch. 3, § 122 (1969) reads in part as follows:
The conservator of the estate under the direction of the court shall have the
care, management and investment of the ward's estate - ..
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become an "alter ego." His powers do not extend to those situations which
require the exercise of a right, power, or election contingent upon personal
judgment or discretion.8 Nonetheless, if a personal right can be shown to be
beneficial to the incompetent, the courts in proper cases will authorize the conservator to exercise the right.9
The relationship between conservator and incompetent is one of trustee and
cestui que trust. 10 As implied from the title of his office, the function of a conservator is to conserve the incompetent's estate.1 These words imply managerial
2
and preservative functions.'
Many rights too personal to be exercised by a conservator are found in
the area of domestic relations. Nevertheless, a conservator may seek an annulment of a marriage entered into by his ward during the period of incompetency? 3
He can with the court's approval make an election between alimony and a lump
15
settlement in a divorce case.1 4 He can also sue to vacate a divorce decree,
however, he cannot seek a divorce for his ward.'
Changes in insurance contracts are almost exclusively contingent upon
personal elections which a conservator cannot exercise. He cannot change the
beneficiary,' 7 even when the purpose is to protect the incompetent's estate from
8 In re Estate of Hirsh, 27 Il1. App. 2d 228, 169 N.E.2d 591 (1960) ; 44 C.J.S., Insane
Persons § 49; supra n.6 at 110.
9 See Newman v. Newman, 42 Ill. App. 2d 203, 191 N.E.2d 614 (1963).
10 See In re Estate of Ekiss, 40 Il. App. 261, 188 N.E.2d 348 (1963).
11 See Proehl v. Leadley, 86 I1. App. 2d 472, 230 N.E.2d 516 (1967).
12 Supra n.6 at 110.
13 In Ertel v. Ertel, 313 Ill. App. 326, 40 N.E.2d 85 (1942), an Illinois court applied
Missouri law in allowing the conservator to seek an annulment of a marriage entered into
by his feeble-minded ward. The court added by way of dictum that the conservator would
not be able to enter into a marriage contract on behalf of his ward because of the personal
nature of such a contract. Pyott v. Pyott, 191 Ill. 280, 61 N.E. 88 (1901) held that a guardian
can maintain a bill in equity to have declared a nullity the marriage of his ward on grounds
of mental incapacity.
14 Newman v. Newman, 42 II. App. 2d 203, 191 N.E.2d 614 (1963). The court stated
that the election was not personal as such. However, a matter of necessity was involved
in the case. The election had to be made, and it was made with court approval. Had it
held the election personal, the court would have had little choice but to hold the election
invalid.
15 Iago v. lago, 168 INI. 339, 48 N.E. 30 (1897). The court allowed a guardian ad litem
to pursue the annulment in incompetent's name. The vacating of a divorce decree would
seem to be a personal right. However, considerable property rights are at stake and the
court no doubt allowed exercise of a personal right as a matter of necessity.
16 Bradford v. Abend, 89 Ill. 78, 31 Am. Rpts. 67 (1878). The incompetent cannot give
consent. However, his conservator can petition to vacate a divorce decree.
17 See, In re Wainman's Estate, 200 N.Y.S. 893, 121 Misc. 318 (1923). In Kay v. Erickson, 209 Wis. 147, 244 N.W. 625 (1932), the court held void the conservator's attempt to
have the ward's estate named as beneficiary after the named beneficiary had died. In In re
Seller's Estate, 154 Ohio St. 483, 96 N.E.2d 595 (1951), the court held void a guardian's
change of beneficiary to the estate of the incompetent although the incompetent had expressed a similar intention prior to adjudication. Although this problem has not been litigated in Illinois, the power involved is so personal that our courts probably would have to
concur that a conservator cannot exercise it. The lone dissenting voice to the overwhelming
majority of authority is Salvato v. Volunteer State Life Insurance Co., 424 S.W.2d 1 (Ct. Civ.

NOTES AND COMMENTS

insolvency.' 8 Similarly he cannot change from quarterly to lump sum the method
of payment to be used upon the incompetent's death. 19
Elections under a will 20 or trust agreement 2' are considered personal and
outside the scope of the conservator's authority. Also too personal to be exercised by a conservator without the consent of the court are a lease of the incompetent's real estate22 and consent to a judgment or compromise. 23 Nor can
a conservator, absent a showing that funds are needed for the maintenance of
the incompetent, vary the property in the estate so as to alter the succession to
24
the property.
Because a joint bank account can be used as an instrument of testamentary
transfer and because the balance struck between the two co-depositors during
their lifetime is a personal one, any withdrawals from the account would have
App. Tex. 1968). The wife of the incompetent was empowered by the court to "manage,
control, and dispose of" the community estate including such part as the incompetent could
have managed in the absence of incompetency. The court held that she had the right to
change the beneficiary on an insurance policy. This result was reached not so much from
the court authority granted to the wife, as from her standing as wife under the community
property laws of Texas. Furthermore, the court noted that the case sought a declaratory
judgment within the lifetime of the husband. The court did not decide whether the original
beneficiaries could be deprived of the proceeds as a result of the change.
18 15 Couch on Insurance § 28:47 (2d ed. 1968).
19 See Zuber v. Zuber, 93 Ohio App. 195, 112 N.E.2d 688 (1952).
20 Such election could only be made by the court. McCartney v. Jacobs, 288 Ill. 568, 128
N.E. 557 (1919) ; The test to be applied by the court is the best interests of the incompetent.
Kinnett v. Hood, 25 II. 2d 600, 185 N.E.2d 888 (1962) ; The court will also look to a clear
intention expressed by the ward prior to his incompetency. First National Bank v. McMillan,
12 Ill. 2d 61, 145 N.E.2d 60 (1957) ; Despite incompetency an election not exercised within
the lifetime of a ward is lost. Rock Island Bank & Trust v. First National Bank, 26 II. 2d
32, 185 N.E.2d 877 (1962). See 21 A.L.R. 3d 320 (1968) for a general discussion.
21 See, Wilmerton v. Wilmerton, 176 F. 896 (7th Cir. 1910) which applied Illinois
law. See also In re Grant's Estate, 122 Misc. 491, 204 N.Y.S. 238 (1924). However, under
Bradshaw v. Lucas, 214 Ill. App. 218 (1919) when the only discretion retained by a trustee
is the method of payment of income, the conservator has a right to the payments. Elections
and powers governing the sale and investment of trust assets are personal and cannot be
made by an incompetent's trustee or committee. See, Chase National Bank of City of New
York v. Ginnel, 50 N.Y.S.2d 345 (S. Ct. 1950); Equitable Trust Co. v. Union National
Bank, 25 Del. Ch. 281, 18 A.2d 228 (1941).
22 Gridley v. Wood, 206 Ill. App. 505 (1917).
23 State v. Phipps, 1 N.C. App. 63, 159 S.E.2d 601 (1968).
24 Zillgitt, Planning for Incompetency and Possibilities and Practices under the Con.
servatorship Law, 37 S. Cal. L. Rev. 181 (1964). In holding that a conservator cannot
invade co-ownership U.S. Savings Bonds, the court preserves the ward's estate plan inherent
in the joint tenancy form of ownership. See, O'Brien, Re-evaluation of a Conservator's
Right to See the Will of His Ward Held by a Third Person, 54 Ill. Bar. J. 128, 131 (Oct.
1965). One case, In re Zaring's Estate, 93 Cal. App. 2d 577, 209 P.2d 642 (1949), held that
a guardian's taking charge of joint tenancy realty does not destroy the four unities, and
any joint property sold retains its joint character in the proceeds. No ademption takes
place in property, the nature of which has been so altered by the conservator as to change
its succession, unless the conservator can show that such change was necessary for the
maintenance of the incompetent. See also Wilmerton v. Wilmerton, 176 F. 896 (7th Cir.
1910) ; Lewis v. Hill, 317 II. App. 531, 47 N.E.2d 127 (1943). However, a court has upheld
a purchase by a conservator of a renunciation of the right to inherit of a devisee under
the incompetent's will in McCarthy v. McCarthy, 9 IlM. App. 2d 462, 133 N.E.2d 763 (1956).
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to result from personal discretion. A conservator, therefore, should not be in
the same position as his ward in being able to withdraw from the account.
TOTTEN TRUST SAVINGS ACCOUNTS

A deposit in the name of one person as trustee for another creates a "Totten
Trust" account. The depositor-trustee has full discretion to withdraw funds during
his lifetime, may expend the proceeds as he sees fit, and is accountable to no one
as a result of the form of deposit. Upon the death of the trustee the beneficiary
acquires ownership of the account. Being payable to the beneficiary only upon
the trustee's death, the "Totten Trust" account is an instrument of estate planning.
Recognizing this notion, the courts have been reluctant to allow a conservator or committee trustee to invade the account. 25 The reason given is that
a personal discretion is necessary for any withdrawal. 26 However, where the funds
are necessary for the support of the trustee, the court can authorize the conservator to withdraw.27 The court may also permit a committee to invade the
account when the evidence shows that the incompetent would have withdrawn
funds, 28 specifically where the assets consist of both a "Totten Trust" account
and real estate, especially when the incompetent is residing on the real estate. 29
The court's right to authorize invasion is premised upon the revocability of the
account.8 0 If a beneficiary can show for some reason the account is an irrevocable trust, the court is powerless to allow the committee to make withdrawals.8 1
Similarly, the committee acting on behalf of an incompetent may apply
to the court to withdraw from a federal savings and loan association trust
account, but only to the extent necessary for the welfare and support of the
82
depositor.
The testamentary aspect of a "Totten Trust" account is clearly analogous
to the right of survivorship in a joint account. The primary difference between
the two is the present ownership and right to withdraw from the joint account.
25 138 A.L.R. 1383 (1942).
26 In re Wandle, 62 N.Y.S.2d 292 (S. Ct. 1944). In Gorfinkel v. First National Bank in
Yonkers, 19 App. Div. 2d 903, 244 N.Y.S.2d 877 (1963), motion to dismiss denied 14 N.Y.2d
836, 251 N.Y.S.2d 682, 200 N.E.2d 575 (1964), afl'd 15 N.Y.2d 71, 15 N.Y.S.2d 338 (1965),
a bank had paid the balance of the account to the committee without a court order. The
court found the bank liable to the beneficiary, but allowed a recovery by the bank against
the committee.
27 Application of National Commercial B. & T. Co., 50 N.Y.S.2d 274 (S. Ct. 1944);
Rickel v. Peck, 211 Minn. 576, 2 N.W.2d 140 (1942). The case of In re Rasmussen's Estate,
147 Misc. 564, 264 N.Y.S. 231 (1933) limits the conservator's right to invade to the necessities of the case and the specific requirements of the incompetent and his dependents.
28 Ganley v. Lincoln Say. Bank of Brooklyn, 257 App. Div. 509, 13 N.Y.S.2d 571 (1939).
29 In re Cuen's Estate, 14.2 Cal. App. 258, 298 P.2d 545 (1956); In re Sabot, 28 Misc.
2d 265, 212 N.Y.S.2d 542 (1961).
80 Brooklyn Trust Co. v. Smart, 161 Misc. 857, 293 N.Y.S. 823 (1937).
31 In re Gross, 62 N.Y.S.2d 392 (S. Ct. 1936).
32 Simmons v. First Federal Savings and Loan Ass'n, 132 F. Supp. 370 (D.D.C. 1955).
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Therefore, the law governing a committee's right to invade a "Totten Trust"
account should be weighed in any determination of a conservator's right to
invade a joint account.
UNITED

STATES SAVINGS BONDS

The law governing co-ownership savings bonds is particularly useful in
trying to determine a conservator's rights in a joint bank account because the
bonds are payable to either party and contain a right of survivorship.
According to the government statutes by which disposition of these bonds
is determined, the representative of an incompetent's estate may receive full
payment of a co-ownership bond. 33 However, only upon payment to one of the
co-owners is the interest of the other extinguished.8 4 A number of cases seem
to have adopted the logic that payment to a co-owner differs from payment to
35
a conservator and, therefore, the other co-owner retains an interest in the bond.
36
Although these bonds involve a contract with the government, once they are re37
deemed state law governs the proceeds.
The states' treatment of the cases has not depended on whether the bonds
were registered "or" or "and." 38 The right of survivorship is valid and, absent
notice to the co-owner of the redemption and a need for the incompetent's maintenance, the co-owner may have a recovery from the estate of the proceeds of
co-ownership bonds redeemed by the conservator.39
The only recognized method for a third party to obtain the proceeds of
40
a co-ownership bond is under a constructive trust theory.
Consequently, the argument that the incompetency of one of the parties
terminated the joint tenancy relationship and converted the funds in the bonds
to a tenancy in common is without merit. 4 1 Similarly a conservator cannot destroy the relationship in a payable on death bond unless 42he can show that the
funds were necessary for the support of the incompetent.
33 31 C.F.R. 315.50 (a).
34 31 C.F.R. 315.60.
35 In re Estate of Johnson, 351 Ill.
App. 111, 113 N.E.2d 590 (1953). The case of
Morris v. Morris, 195 Tenn. 133, 258 S.W.2d 732 (1953), held that although a conservator
has the legal right to redeem, he is legally bound to re-invest the proceeds in accordance
with the terms of the original bonds.
36 Chamberlain v. Robinson, 305 S.W.2d 817 (Tex. Civ. App. 1957); In re Damon's
Guardianship, 238 Iowa 570, 28 N.W.2d 48 (1947).
37 In re Barnes' Will, 4 Wis. 2d 22, 89 N.W.2d 807 (1958).
38 In re Peters, 50 N.Y.S.2d 573 (S. Ct. 1944).
39 In re Church's Estate, 141 F. Supp. 703 (D.D.C. 1956); In re Estate of Hirsh, 27
Ill. App. 2d 228, 169 N.E.2d 591 (1960) ; In re Barletta's Estate, 2 Misc.2d 135, 150
N.Y.S.2d 479 (1956).
40 Levites v. Levites, 27 Ill.
App. 2d 274, 169 N.E.2d 574 (1960). Otherwise the court
says that it is well settled that a co-owner or death beneficiary acquires a present interest
in the bond despite its retention by the purchaser.
41 Zum Brunnen v. Niebuhr, 3 Wis. 570, 89 N.W.2d 215 (1958).
42 Cornelison v. Walters, 178 Kan. 607, 290 P.2d 1016 (1955).
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JOINT SAVINGS ACCOUNTS IN OTHER JURISDICTIONS

The general rule in various jurisdictions has been that the conservator,
guardian, or committee does not succeed to the full discretionary rights of his
ward, but, at best, to the privilege of withdrawing, when necessary, that amount
43
of money essential to maintain the incompetent.
Ohio originally adopted the position that an adjudication of incompetency
terminated the joint relationship and, therefore, the joint agreement. The court
said that, unless "extraordinary circumstances" could be shown, the guardian
44
and the co-depositor were each entitled to one half the balance in the account.
The next case in this jurisdiction upheld this reasoning but said that a husbandwife relationship is one of the "extraordinary circumstances" which requires
special treatment. 45 Two subsequent cases established a right of survivorship
in the co-depositor. 46 Finally, the original rule was supplanted by the idea that
47
a guardian could not destroy the joint and survivorship relationship.
New York's rule is that a joint tenancy is to be presumed during the
lifetimes of the parties and be conclusive upon the death of either. 48 Consequently, a bank with notice of the incompetency which pays the account to the
co-depositor is liable to the incompetent's estate for one half of the joint tenancy
49
funds.
Massachusetts has held that where a gift to the co-depositor of the funds
in the joint account can be shown, the conservator may not invade except for
the needs of the incompetent.50
43 See generally, 62 A.L.R.2d 1091 (1958); 10 Am. Jur. 2d, Banks § 371; supra n.4
at 618.
44 Abrams v. Nickel, 50 Ohio App. 500, 198 N.E. 887 (1935). This case has received
much criticism.
45 Ulmer v. Society for Savings, 41 N.E.2d 578 (Ct. App. Ohio 1942).
46 In re Estate of Jones, 68 Ohio L. Abs. 282, 122 N.E.2d 111, (1952); National City
Bank of Cleveland v. Hewes, 90 Ohio L. Abs. 372, 186 N.E.2d 644, (1962). These two cases
distinguished Abrams and Ulmer as dealing only with the rights between the two parties
while they were living. In re Estate of Jones, infra, criticizes as not quite accurate the statement in Abrams that a joint and survivorship account must come to an end upon the appointment of a guardian.
.47 Miller v. Yocum, 18 Ohio App. 2d 52, 246 N.E.2d 594 (1969), aff'd 21 Ohio St.
2d 162, 256 N.E.2d 208 (1969) ; Guerra v. Guerra, 25 Ohio Misc. 1, 265 N.E.2d 818 (1970).
The view now is that each case must be decided on its own facts. Apparently the presumption is that a joint and survivorship account was intended. This change of attitude
came quickly after the decision of In re Webb, 18 Ohio App. 2d 287, 249 N.E.2d 83 (1969).
In this case a most inequitable result befell the wife of an incompetent decedent when the
rule in Abrams was applied.
48 Pendley v. Pendley, 163 Misc. 571, 298 N.Y.S. 311 (1937); Gardner v. Henderson,
35 N.Y.S.2d 439 (S. Ct. 1942); Petition of Cummings, 66 N.Y.S.2d 799 (S. Ct. 1946).
49 Napolitano v. Manhattan Say. Bank, 50 N.Y.S.2d 861 (S. Ct. 1944), afi'd as modified
269 App. Div. 563, 56 N.Y.S. 367 (1945), afi'd 295 N.Y. 727, 65 N.E.2d 430 (1946).
50 Johnson v. Nourse, 258 Mass. 417, 155 N.E. 457 (1927); Drain v. Brookline Say.
Bank, 327 Mass. 435, 99 N.E.2d 160 (1950); Coolidge v. Brown, 286 Mass. 504, 190 N.E.
723 (1934).
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Most jurisdictions are in accord with Massachusetts that a guardian or
conservator should not be allowed to withdraw from joint bank accounts. Wisconsin, 51 California, 52 Michigan,"3 and apparently Alabama54 find that the form
of deposit raises a presumption that the intention of the parties was to create
a right of survivorship; and as a result, withdrawal from the account is an exercise of personal discretion not to be made by the conservator unless he can
show need. One Oklahoma case does not follow the presumption theory. However,
if other evidence establishes the intention to create a joint certificate of deposit

with a right of survivorship, the Oklahoma court follows the majority and will
not allow the guardian to invade the fund. 55
Many jurisdictions, however, treat the problem differently. Pennsylvania5 6
and Delaware 57 both recognize tenancies by the entirety. A withdrawal of the
balance in the account by one spouse after the other spouse and co-depositor
is adjudicated incompetent is without legal effect to destroy the right of survivorship to the funds. Both husband and wife must join in the act which destroys
a tenancy by the entirety.
A Nebraska case appears to deal with the account as a contract with the
bank which evidences a completed gift of an interest in the account upon the
making of the deposit. However this position is not entirely clear from the
5s
opinion.
One Minnesota case determined the rights in two certificates of deposit
which had been renewed for a number of years in the joint names of the plaintiff
and the incompetent with the right of survivorship. The court held that the
guardian was without power to change one certificate during its term, but was
obligated to redeem the other which was at maturity, and transfer the balance
to his guardian's account.59
51 Boehmer v. Boehmer, 264 Wis. 15, 58 N.W.2d 411 (1953); Plainse v. Engle, 260
Wis. 506, 56 N.W.2d 89 (1952). Wisconsin recognizes a difference between a guardian and
a conservator. The latter is appointed upon the voluntary application of a person who believes
he is unable to manage his own property. Because no adjudication is made regarding competency, the applicant is designated conservatee and may revoke the conservatorship at
will. As a result the Wisconsin Supreme Court has allowed a conservator to establish a
joint account when such a result was clearly intended by the conservatee. In re Evans'
Estate, 28 Wis. 2d 97, 135 N.W.2d 832 (1965).
52 In re Estate & Guardianship of Wood, 193 Cal. App. 2d 260, 14 Cal. Rptr. 147
(1961) ; Doran v. Hibernia Savings & Loan Soc., 80 Cal. App. 2d 790, 182 P. 2d 630 (1947).
53 First Federal Say. & L. Ass'n of Detroit v. Savallisch, 364 Mich. 168, 110 N.W.2d
724 (1961).
54 Howard v. Imes, 265 Ala. 298, 90 So. 2d 818 (1956) ; Perdue v. State Nat. Bank,
254 Ala. 80, 47 So. 2d 261 (1950).
55 Hendricks v. Grant County Bank, 379 P.2d 693 (S. Ct. Okla. 1963).
56 In re Gallagher's Estate, 352 Pa. 476, 43 A. 2d 132 (1945).
57 In re Griffith, 33 Del. Ch. 387, 93 A. 2d 920 (1953).
58 First Trust Co. of Lincoln v. Hammond, 140 Neb. 330, 299 N.W. 496 (1941),
supplemented by 140 Neb. 330, 300 N.W. 808 (1941). Both plaintiff and defendant rested
upon close of plaintiff's evidence.
59 Hagen v. Rekow, 253 Minn. 341, 91 N.W. 2d 768 (1958).
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New Jersey courts have twice ruled on situations in which one spouse has
transferred the balance from a joint account to an account in his name alone,
after the other spouse and co-depositor had been adjudicated incompetent. The
court held in both cases that the closing of the account severed the joint tenancy
and created a tenancy in common. Therefore, each party or his estate was entitled to one half the balance in each account.60
The
from the
rule may
to aid in

variance among the courts which have considered the problem stems
general confusion surrounding joint accounts. 61 Although a majority
be emerging, no uniform rule could be brought before an Illinois court
its determination of the problem.
CURRENT STATUS OF THE JOINT
SAVINGS ACCOUNT IN ILLINOIS

The status of the joint savings account has recently undergone a transformation in the Illinois courts.6 2 The former Illinois rule was based on a theory
of contract. If the contract with the bank provided for a joint tenancy with the
63
right of survivorship, then that was the type of account that was established.
In 1955 the Illinois Supreme Court decided the case of In re Estate of Schneider6 4 under the theory that when a donor puts the name of the donee on his
savings account as a joint owner, he has made a gift. Under the new gift theory
as developed by later cases, the form of deposit is only presumptive as to joint
ownership. 6 5
Although it has caused sweeping changes in some areas, the change from
contract to gift theory should have little if any effect upon the right of a con60 Stout v. Sutphen, 132 N.J. Eq. 583, 29 A. 2d 724 (1943); Steinmetz v. Steinmetz,
130 N.J. Eq. 176, 21 A. 2d 743 (1941).
61 For a good general discussion of the entire joint bank account area, see Kepner,
The Joint and Survivorship Bank Account--a Concept without a Name, 41 Cal. L. Rev.
596 (1953), and Kepner, Five More Years of the Joint Bank Account Muddle, 26 U. Chi.
L. Rev. 376 (1959).
62 Supra n. 61 at 383.
63 In re Estate of Wilson, 404 Ill. 207, 88 N.E.2d 662 (1949) ; Reder v. Reder, 312 II.
209, 143 N.E. 418 (1924) ; Illinois Trust & Say. Bank v. Van Vlack, 310 Ill. 185, 141 N.E.
546 (1923) ; Swofford v. Swofford, 327 Ill. App. 55, 63 N.E.2d 615 (1945).
64 6 Il. 2d 176, 127 N.E.2d 445 (1955). Many observers have made note that this
case dealt with a Savings and Loan Association joint account which was not covered under
Ill. Rev. Stat., ch. 76, § 2 (a) (1955) as were bank accounts. The cases subsequent to In
re Estate of Schneider have followed its rationale although Savings and Loan Association
joint accounts are now covered by Ill. Rev. Stat., ch. 76, § 2 (c) (1969).
65 These cases establish a line of authority that Ill. Rev. Stat., Ch. 76, § 2(a) and
§ 2(c) (1969) are only protective of the institution and not determinative of the rights
between the parties. Murgic v. Granite City Trust & Say. Bk., 31 M. 2d 580, 202 N.E.2d 519
(1964) ; In re Estate of Mueth, 33 Ill. 2d 449, 179 N.E.2d 695 (1962) ; Frey v. Wubbena
26 Ill. 2d 53, 186 N.E.2d 49 (1962) ; In re Estate of Liberio, 43 Ill. App. 2d 261, 193 N.E.2d
482 (1963) ; In re Estate of Cronholm, 38 Ill. App. 2d 141, 186 N.E.2d 534 (1962) ; In re
Estate of Corirossi, 36 Ill. App. 2d 249, 183 N.E.2d 305 (1961) ; In re Estate of Fitterer,
27 11. App. 2d 264, 169 N.E.2d 578 (1960) ; In re Estate of Deskovic, 21 Ill. App. 2d 209,
157 N.E.2d 769 (1959).

NOTES AND COMMENTS

servator to invade a joint account.68 It would seem reasonable for Illinois to
join the majority rule and deny the conservator the power to withdraw since a
presumption is created that a joint account with the right of survivorship was
intended.
CONCLUSION

The decisions in In re Estate of Cook 67 and Manta v. Kah6 8 do not settle
the question of an Illinois estate conservator to invade joint savings accounts.
The apparent trend in the Illinois courts is to hold that a deposit in a joint account is presumptive of an intention to create a joint tenancy with the right of
survivorship. Absent a showing of need for the maintenance of the incompetent,
the conservator should have no right to invade. Those savings institutions which
require either a court order or joining of the co-depositor in withdrawals take the
more reasonable approach.
The treatment of joint accounts is so diverse that a case with a peculiar
factual situation could turn the Illinois rule in any direction. Furthermore,
the cases of record do not indicate how a factual situation in which the
competent co-depositor has provided a portion of the consideration would be
handled. Neither have the cases examined the situation of a competent co-depositor who needs a portion of the joint funds for his own maintenance.
The legislature should, therefore, enact statutory measures to bring certainty
to this area. Because of the mobility of our populace, the practice of maintaining
accounts in various states is common. A uniform banking code could be a more
desirable solution. This would not only define what a conservator's rights are
with respect to joint accounts, but would clear up the general confusion in the
law surrounding the status of bank accounts.
BRUNO W. TABIS, JR.
66 Supra n.1 at 221:
If it appears that the intent of the original depositor was that the co-creditor
should not draw upon the account, or should withdraw the funds only for the use
of the depositor, then no gift results, and this is so whether the contract or the gift
theory is applied.
67 282 II. App. 412 (1934).
68 348 Ill. App. 375, 108 N.E.2d 781 (1952).

